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Heilbron: Decline of Establishment Clause

NOTE
THE DECLINE OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:

EFFECT OF RECENT SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS ON
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
LOUIS H. HEILBRON'

INTRODUCTION

This note relates how a grand constitutional concept set
forth in the First Amendment has suffered serious erosion in
the last twenty years through decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. In particular, two recent decisions have had a
profound effect on church - state relations by merging, rather
than separating, church and state. Both cases were five-to-four
decisions and in the educational field: Zelman v. SimmonsHarris concerning vouchers and Good News Club v. Milford
Central School concerning after-class activities in a public elementary school.' The combined opinions cover almost 200
• University of California Boalt Hall Law School. Admitted to the California
Bar Association in 1930.
1 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). Establishment clause cases and comments could fill a
small library. For an excellent summary of the opposing social and political forces
joined in the conflict over school. vouchers see Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections
on the School. Voucher Case, 116 HARv. LAw REV. 163 (analyzing the Zelman case
opinions in the context of five-to-four decisions and their effect on Supreme Court jurisprudence).
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pages of rationale, argument, and citations. This article attempts to set forth the main points of differences and provides
some comment with respect to them. The evidence of the erosion will be found in the opinions!
ANALYSIS

Zelman involves an Ohio statute that provides scholarship
aid to families in any school district under state control pursuant to federal court order.3 The only district to accept the program was Cleveland, however, whose public schools were performing miserably.' In every grade, Cleveland was among the
worst in the nation in test evaluations, in the percentage of
dropout, and in school attendance. s The most adversely affected children were those from minority families living below
the poverty line. 6
In an attempt to remedy the situation, the Ohio state
scholarship project allows parents in low-income families to
choose among several tuition programs. Parents may either
receive payments for tutors if they wish their children to remain in public school or select and assign payments up to
$2,250.00 for tuition to a secular or religious private school. B
The tuition amounts are determined by the level of financial
need: Other existing publicly funded schools are available for
parental choice including community or chartered schools and
magnet schools. 10
7

2 My interest is simply to highlight certain of the contentions in the Supreme
Court opinions that show the vigor of the debates in the two subject cases and to indicate the views of the dissenters with their emphasis on substantive religious content
which may yet revive the Establishment Clause in this educational area.
3 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002).
4Id. at 645.
SId. at 644.
6Id.
7Id.
BId. at 645-6. Ninety percent of the amount charged for such assistance up to
$360.00. For a review of the Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and its inconsistencies, see comment Ashley M. Bell, "God Save This Honorable Court": How Current
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled with the Secularization of
Historical Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1273 (2001).
9 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002).
I°Id. at 647. Magnet Schools specialize in teaching methods or subjects like
foreign language, computers or the arts.
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During this period, eighty-two percent of the available private schools were religious.
Ninety-six percent of the lowincome parents chose to send their children to religious
schools. 12 The participating private schools had to agree not to
discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background, advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of
any person or groUp.13 Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for
the court, held that there was no constitutional violation. lo The
question presented was whether the government aid to the religious schools violated the Establishment Clause. 15 The scholarship law had a clear secular basis: to provide educational assistance for poor children failing in public school. 16 Government
enhancement or endorsement of religion was not involved, because the government occupied a neutral position. 17 Not only
did the parents endorse the government checks to the private
schools, but the choice of school was that of the parents in the
district; they had the benefit of a variety of options. IS
The court declared the holding to be in line with decisions
supporting indirect public aid to religious institutions. 10
Rehnquist called attention to a number of Supreme Court
cases, stressing Mueller v. Allen, Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, and Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District.2O In these cases, the aid was directed
by individual or parental choice where a large class of people
were entitled to make the choice. 21
In Mueller, the subject Minnesota statute permits parents
to deduct from state income taxes the costs of tuition, text1l

ll[d.
12

[d.

13 [d.

at 645.
[d. at 644.
15 [d.
16 [d. at 649.
The principal constitutional question on the validity of vouchers
has been determined. Many states, however, have constitutional restrictions more
restrictive than the Establishment Clause in the Constitution. See Sands v. Morongo
United Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 882 (Cal. 1991). These may be the subject of future
litigation.
17 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002).
18 [d. at 646.
19 [d. at 649.
20 [d.
21 See generally Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Witters v. Washington
Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
14
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books, and transportation, regardless of whether their children
attended public, secular, or religious private schools. 22 All taxpayers were deemed to have the privilege, but the parents of
children in public schools did not receive tuition money for
regular sessions.23 Instead, they were given other minor benefits similar to those received by the parents of children enrolled
in private schools." Naturally, the state paid the teachers, administrative and miscellaneous expenses of the public schools.
Reviewing Minnesota's program in Mueller as a whole, the
Court in Zelman found that the selection of the religious
schools represented numerous private choices available to individual parents of school-age children!" No "imprimatur of state
approval" was found even though the great majority of the
beneficiaries (ninety-six percent) were parents of children in
religious schools.27
In Witters, the court upheld a scholarship program that
provided tuition aid, under vocational assistance to the blind,
to a student studying at a religious institution to become a pastor.2B The individual had numerous options to obtain a vocational or professional education at other colleges, but he independently chose a religious institution.29 Similarly, in Zobrest,
an individual selected a religious school for his education. 30 He
was deaf and required a sign-language interpreter to assist him
in the course of instruction."' Such interpreters were available
at public expense in all public and private schools.32 This was a
neutral service with respect to religion, providing assistance to
a broad class of citizens, some of whom directed government
aid to religious schools. 33
The Court's position in Zelman is clearly set forth in the
final paragraph of its opinion:
25

Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390 (1983).
Id. at 391.
" Id.
25Id.
26 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 650 (2002).
27 Id. at 658.
28 Witters v. Washington Dep't ofServs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,482 (1986).
29 Id. at 487-88.
3{) Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
3' Id. at 3.
32Id.
33 Id. at 10.
22
23
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In sum, the Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to
religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a
particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular
and religious. The program is therefore a program of true private choice. In keeping with an unbroken line of decisions rejecting challenges to similar programs, we hold that the program does not offend the Establishment Clause. 34

Justice O'Connor in a concurrent opinion emphasizes true
private choices and the neutrality of the provisions of the
voucher law. 3s She refers to a substantial number of situations
involving independent aid where religious schools have shared
benefits available to public schools, nonsectarian private
schools, and charitable institutions:" In particular, she refers
to real estate and income tax exemptions available to religious
institutions as well as to charitable programs, including reimbursement to parents for transportation costs to and from
school, whether sectarian or nonsectarian; Medicare funds
available to religious affiliated hospitals; federal tuition dollars
spent for tuition at private four year colleges; and federal funding of social and health programs administered by religious
affiliated institutions. 37 Compared with these public aid programs, the Ohio program expense represents a drop in the
bucket.
Justice O'Connor refers to the three-pronged test to determine whether a statute passes the requirements of the Establishment Clause, namely, that it has a secular legislative purpose, that its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it does not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion. 36 The second and third prongs, she
holds, rest on the same evidence:" In the case of indirect aid,
the program passes the test if it is administered in a neutral
fashion, without differentiation based on religious status of the
beneficiary or provider of services, and if beneficiaries have a
34

35
36

37
38
39

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002).
at 663-4
at 664.
at 666-7.
at 668, citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 668.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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genuine choice among religious and non-religious organizations. Applying the test to the facts in the instant case, she
finds no primary effect of advancing religion or excessive entanglement.'o
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, sets forth the
provocative thesis that the Fourteenth Amendment should be
less rigidly applied in Establishment Clause cases to state action than in other First Amendment cases. 41 His position is
that the Fourteenth Amendment emphasizes equality of treatment." States should be allowed to experiment in ways to provide equality in public, private, sectarian or non-sectarian
schools. 43 In effect, the subject statute provides equal opportunity for quality education to the poor, especially minority poor,
and he asserts, has the same objective as Brown v. Board of
Education."
The dissenting opinions, to a considerable extent, disregard arguments of the majority as being preoccupied with the
formal, procedural effects of the case.'5 The majority opinion
stresses the principle of neutrality in the administration of the
aid; the idea that choice by the parents makes a substantial
difference and provides constitutionality in an otherwise unconstitutional situation. 46 If the effect of indirect aid is the
same as of direct aid, and in such case would be in violation of
the Establishment Clause, parental choice cannot bridge the
breach.'7 The dissents dwell on the nature of the religious edu-,
cation, the claim of religious indoctrination, and the present or
potential effect of social division resulting from validating the
Ohio statute. 48
Justice Breyer is deeply concerned about the potential effect of general government support of religious schools, direct
or indirect.'9 He believes that "The [First Amendment] Clauses
4°Id.
41 Id. at 678-9. This thesis was previously advanced by Justice Harlan. Id. at
679, citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 699 (1970) (concurring).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 667.
45 Id. at 685.
46 Id. at 653.
47 Id. at 664.
48 Id. at 687.
49Id. at 717.
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reflect the Framers' vision of an American nation free of the
religious strife that had long plagued the nations of Europe."50
Many of the Court's 20th century Establishment Clause cases
"focused directly upon social conflict, potentially created when
government becomes involved in religious education." 5' Thus,
it was held that the Establishment Clause forbids prayer in
public, elementary, or secondary schools, Bible reading in class,
and state funding of religious school teachers. 52 The purpose,
in part, was to avoid religious divisiveness. 53 True, the divisiveness factor was not present "in the early years of the Republic."'" Students attending public schools were almost entirely Protestants. 55 By the mid-19th century, however, immigration changed the religious populations and non-Protestant
religions, Catholics in particular, began to resist Protestant
domination. 56 In turn Protestants "terrorized Catholics," and
Catholics sought public assistance for their schools. 57 The
courts were confronted with two possible solutions to avoid the
restrictions of the Establishment Clause: 1) give government
support to all religions on an equal basis or 2) separate them. 58
Diversity made equal-opportunity funding for all religions impossible without promoting competition and religious strife:"
As a result, fairly clear lines of separation between church and
state had to be drawn, certainly "where primary religious education is at issue."""
More than fifty-five different religious groups and subgroups now exist in the United States."' Equal treatment of
religions in the primary and secondary classrooms would be
impossible because of such diversity of beliefs and practices."2

50 Id. at 718, citing Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Sch.s, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1680,
1692 (1969).
51 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 718.
52Id.
53 Id. at 719
54 Id. at 720
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 720-1.
58 Id. at 721.
59 Id. at 722.
60 Id. at 723.
61 Id., citing B. Kosmin, E. Mayer, & A. Keysar, GRADUATE CENTER OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK, American Religious Identification Survey 12-13 (2001).
62 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 723.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 1

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

224

[Vol. 34

The separation objective is essential. 63 General government
support of religious private education would provoke competition for public money; "it will tap sectarian religion's capacity
for discord."64 Moreover, in the attempt to assure fair treatment, government would become unduly involved in rulemaking and intrusion into the religious program concerned. 65
In this light, Justice Breyer further considers the Ohio
statute. He notes that it provides that no participating school
"teach hatred of any person or group" on various grounds, including religion. 66 The state is required to revoke registration
"if after a hearing," the superintendent finds a violation of the
voucher program's rules. 67 "What kind of public hearing will
there be in response to claims that one religion or another is
continuing to teach a view of history that casts members of
other religions in the worst possible light?"68 In addition, when
a claim that one religion or another takes a controversial view
of a topic of great general interest, such as the conflict in the
Middle East, efforts to respond will "seriously entangle church
and state" and "promote division among religious groups," particularly "if a religious group fears unfair treatment at the
hands of government."69 The Justice continues: school voucher
programs differ from the neutral kind of government assistance
given in the form of secular textbooks and computers furnished·
religious schools. 70 The voucher programs "direct financing to a
core function of the church: the teaching of religious truths to
young children.'m
Justice Rehnquist replies to Justice Breyer in a footnote in
the majority opinion.72 He states that "Breyer would raise the
invisible specter of 'divisiveness' and 'religious strife' to find the
program unconstitutional."'3 The court rejected the claim that
some speculative potential for divisiveness bears on the constiId.
Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67Id.
66 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73Id.
63
64

at 722.
at 715.
at 724.

at 725.
at 727.
at 726.
at 662, n.7.
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tutionality of educational aid." Such considerations, once occupied the court, were eliminated by the decision in Aguilar v.
Felton. 75 "It is curious indeed to base our interpretation of the
Constitution on speculation as to the likelihood of a phenomenon which the parties may create merely by prosecuting a lawsuit. m •
Justice Stevens finds that a law that authorizes the use of
public funds to pay for the indoctrination of thousands of
grammar school children in particular religious faiths is a "law
respecting an establishment of religion" and violates the first
amendment. 77 He considers irrelevant the "severe educational
crisis" that confronted the Cleveland City School District, the
wide ranges of choices that had been made available to students within the public school system and the voluntary character of the private choice to prefer a parochial education over
an education in the public school system. 7S He agrees with his
fellow dissenters that the Court's decision is "profoundly misguided" and increases the risk of religious strife. 79
Justice Souter traces the history of the relationship of the
Establishment Clause to education since Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing. so The principle was clearly stated: "No tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion."
B1 He states that the court "has never in so many words overruled Everson."B2
In the Cleveland case, the overwhelming amount of the
voucher money was spent for the support of religious schools,
paying for students' instruction in secular subjects and in religion as well, "in schools that can fairly be characterized as
founded to teach religious doctrine and to imbue teaching in all
subjects with a religious dimension.".83 He then details many of
[d.
[d.
76 [d., quoting Aguilar v. Felton 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985).
77 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 684.
78 [d. at 684-85.
79 [d. at 685.
80 [d. at 686.
81 [d. at 687 citing Everson v. Bd. ofEduc. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1,16 (1947).
82 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 687.
83 [d.
74

75
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the leading cases in the modern era that have led "to doctrinal
bankruptcy."B4 While Everson espoused the basic principle of no
tax dollars for religious education, it allowed, with some tension, the right of free transportation for all children to and from
schools, including religious schools, as a public service. 85 Then
followed approval of lending textbooks to religious schools for
teaching secular subjects, characterized as a benefit to parents
despite dissents that book use may "inevitably tend to the religious views of the favored sect. "86
Lemon v. Kurtzman recognized that supplementing salaries for teachers of secular subjects, in a pervasive religious
atmosphere, would require intensive government monitoring
resulting in unconstitutional entanglement."7 For a number of
years following Lemon, any improper diversion of public aid to
religious purpose was found unconstitutional. In Grand Rapids
v. Ball, a Michigan school district provided "remedial and enrichment" support to the core curriculum in mathematics, reading, art, and physical education in non-public schools, particularly religious schools. 88 The parent handbook of a Catholic
school stated the goal as a "God-oriented environment which
permeates the total educational program.""" The policy statement in other schools emphasized that the "word of God must
be an all-pervading force in the educational program.""" The
court concluded "that the challenged programs have the effect
of promoting religion. 1191
Beginning with Mueller v. Allen, the court paid less attention to the prospect of division. 92 Minnesota tax deductions for
tuition and other expenses of parents of children attending religious school were upheld on the basis that the deductions
were available to all parents. 93 The court reasoned that parents
were making private choices when they sent their children to
parochial schools instead of to public or private secular
[d. at 688.
[d.at 689.
86 [d. at 690.
87 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
88 Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375 (1985).
89 [d. at 379.
90 [d.
91 Id. at 397.
92 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
93 [d. at 397.
84
85
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schools. 94 The opposite result was reached in Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist. 95 This court
struck down a New York program of tuition grants for poor
parents and tax deductions for more aflluent ones who sent
their children to private schools.96 Although only fifteen percent of religious school budgets was furnished by government,
the aid supported religious uses. 97 Though the aid was provided
through parents, the program did not evade the Establishment
Clause restriction.
Between 1985 and 1997, a series of cases emphasized neutrality and private choice. The aid was isolated from the religious program. Money for a sign-language interpreter in a religious school, aid to disabled children as the main beneficiaries
of a religious social association, and use of neutrally available
public funds to pay for an evangelical magazine, along with
other student magazines printed by the University of Virginia,
were approved. Grand Rapids was overruled in Agostini v.
Felton, which held that remedial education was simply supplemental education to eligible students and devoid of religious
influence. With respect to the use of vouchers, Justice Souter
contends that neutrality is more than evenhandedness. 100
The appropriate question is, "Does the scheme follow a religious direction?" Choice in Cleveland, with respect to the use
of vouchers, was narrow. Only ninety percent of $360 in a public school or up to $2,250 in private schools, secular and religious, most of it being directed to religious schools, was spent.IOI
The private secular schools were not in a position to accommodate many voucher children because of a lack of capacity.IOO
Souter does not consider the existing public schools, including charter and magnet schools, as part of the voucher system of choice. loa The evidence is that "almost two out of three
families using vouchers to send their children to religious
98

99

Id. at 399.
Comm. for Pub.Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
96 [d. at 798.
97 [d. at 787-88.
98 [d. at 798.
99 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997).
100 [d. at 253.
101 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 697 (2002).
102 [d. at 646.
103 [d. at 647.
94

95
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schools did not embrace the religion of those schools."IO' They
sent their children because of the educational opportunity, not
because they wished their children to be proselytized.lo5 Thus,
he claims almost ninety-seven percent of voucher money going
to the religious school simply does not reflect a genuine freedom of choice. 106
With respect to educational content, he points out that
most of the aid supports the whole religious enterprise, not just
the secular part. 107 A tax to support a religion is against the
freedom of conscience. lOS Madison thought the Establishment
Clause was violated by any "authority which can force a citizen
to contribute three pence ... of his property for the support of
any ... establishment. moo
Finally, he contends "an objective of the Establishment
Clause is to save religion from its own corruption and to prevent efforts to shape beliefs in order to gain political advantage, particularly to compete for public funds.lIO The door of
government religious regulation is opened. Efforts already are
underway to raise the value of vouchers.lll If aid goes up, independence will come down; perhaps government will hold a veto
on curriculum. 112 So, we end with "doctrinal bankruptcy."113
Justice Souter's last two lines express a hope that a future
court will reconsider. lI•
The Good News Club v. Milford Central School involved
school children, but under entirely different circumstances. 115
This case dealt with activities after school on premises made
Id. at 704.
Id.
106 Id. at 707.
107 Id. at 708.
108 Id. at 711.
109 Id.
l1°Id.
111 Id. at 706.
112 Id at 715.
113 Id. at 688.
114 Id. at 716.
115 The Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). It has been
asserted that the Good News decision can be applied in a manner that maintains the
separation of church and state by opening the after class sessions hours later rather
than immediately after the close of the regular sessions, thus arguably removing any
sense of public school endorsement of the religious program. James L. Underwood,
Applying the Good News Club Decision In a Manner That Maintains the separation of
Church and State in Our Sch.s, 47 VILL. L. REV. 281 (2002).
104

105
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available by the school district. 116 The same differences in perceptions of what is government neutrality and improper government endorsement mark the majority and dissenting opinIOns.
Milford Elementary School, under New York law, was authorized to adopt policies allowing it to open its building to public use." In 1992, the school enacted a policy adopting purposes for which its building could be used after school, including "social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainment
events, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community, provided that such uses shall be nonexclusive and shall be
opened to the general public." 118 The parties agreed that the
policy provided for a limited public forum.""
The Good News Club is a private organization for children
ages six to twelve supported by an evangelical religious society.'20 The Club sought permission to hold immediate after-school meetings in the school building. 12 ' With respect to
these meetings, the Club advised:
7

The Club opens its session with Ms. Fournier taking attendance. As she calls a child's name, if the child recites a Bible
verse the child receives a treat. Mter attendance, the Club
sings songs. Next, Club members engage in games that involve, inter alia, learning Bible verses. Ms. Fournier then relates a Bible story and explains how it applies to Club members' lives. The Club closes with a prayer. Finally, Ms.
Fournier distributes treats and the Bible verses for memorization.'22

The Milford School determined that activities so described
"were not a discussion of secular subjects such as child rearing,
development of character and development of morals from a
religious perspective, but were in fact the equivalent of reli-

ll6
ll7

ll8
ll9

120
121
122

Good News, 533 U.S. at 102.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 106.
[d. at 103.
[d.
[d.
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gious instruction itself.m23 The Milford Board of Education rejected the Club's request for use of the school facilities.
The Club filed an action in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of New York alleging that Milford's denial violated its free speech rights and its right to
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. l25 The district court gave summary judgment in favor of the Milford
School, determining that the subject matter "is decidedly religious in nature. m2• Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the district court's holding was reversed. 127
The majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas, held that
the Club was entitled to use the school premises for its program. l26 The court declared that the state's restrictions on
speech are subject to stricter scrutiny in a traditional or open
forum than in a limited public forum. l29 In this context of a limited forum, the State must not discriminate against speech on
the basis of viewpoint. lao To exclude the Club program
amounted to "viewpoint discrimination."131 Milford was simply
engaging in discussion of subjects such as child rearing and
"the teaching of morals and character from a religious standpoint. ma2 One could use Aesop's Fables to teach children moral
values or the Boy Scouts could meet "to influence a boy's character, development and spiritual growth."I33 Any group that
"promotes the moral and character development of children"
would be eligible to use the school building and that must include The Good News Club.
I

"

I

"

[d. at 103-4.
[d. at 104.
125 [d.
126 [d. at 104-5.
127 [d. at 120.
128 [d. at 102.
129 [d. at 106.
lao [d. at 106-7.
131 [d. at 109.
132 [d. at 108.
133 [d.
134 Full discussions of the Milford case are contained in Leading Cases, 115
HARVARD L. REv. 396, 397 (2001) and in an essay in James L. Underwood, Applying the
Good News Club Decision [n a Manner That Maintains the separation of Church and
State in Our Schools, 47 VILL. L. REV. 281 (2002). Both articles point out that under
the limited forum doctrine, the right of religious groups to access public facilities for
extra-curricular meetings has now been recognized in state universities, public secondary schools and now in grade schools, the elementary schools requiring parental consent. As for content, the Harvard article contends that worship often contains moral
123
124
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The opinion cited Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School District. ISS The school district in that case had
opened its forum to "social, civic, or recreational use. III36 The
school district was found to have engaged in viewpoint discrimination when it excluded showing films in the evening on
school premises that sought to teach moral lessons from a
Christian perspective. 13' The opinion also cited Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, in which the Supreme Court overturned the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit decision that denied university funding for
printing expenses of a student publication that presented a
Christian viewpoint. 136 Other student organizations, however,
were entitled to the subsidy for their publications.'39 The publication challenged Christians "to live, in word and deed, according to their faith. III40 The Court in Good News said "We disagree
that something that is "quintessentially religious" or "decidedly
religious in nature" cannot also be characterized properly as
the teaching of morals and character development from a particular viewpoint. 11141
The opinion in Good News held that there was no Establishment Clause violation. "As in Lamb's Chapel, the Club's
meetings were held after school hours, not sponsored by the
school, and open to any student who obtained parental consent,
not just to Club members.III43 The situation demonstrated "neutrality towards religion. I.. The Club had sought "nothing more
I ..

values and, in a relationship between speech and character development, should be on
the same basis as Bible clubs. It advocates that the Establishment Clause should be
used as the test for religious speech, particularly that government should not send a
message that makes either religious adherents or non adherents feel isolated from the
larger political community and the message is what it is perceived to be by a hypothetical reasonable observer of the community (in the Milford-type case, a child observer in the elementary school.).
136 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 105 (2001), citing Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
136 Good News, 533 U.S. at 109.
137 Id. The forum was open mainly to adults
138 Id. at 110, citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. of Va., 515 U.S.
819 (1995).
139 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. of Va., 515 U.S at 826.
140 Good News, 533 U.S. at 110.
141 Id. at 111.
142 Id. at 112.
143 Id. at 113.
144 Id. at 114.
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than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about
the same topics as other groupS."l45
Justice Scalia concurred wholly.146 Regarding free speech,
he said that the main purpose of the Club is to urge children to
moral conduct; the fact that additional religious speech, 'to
trust the Lord Jesus to be their Savior from sin,' does not
transform the Club's meetings into something different from
other non-religious activities that teach moral and character
development. l47 It is error to require sterility of speech that is
not demanded of other groupS.I46 The Boy Scouts are urged "to
keep morally straight" and give reasons for doing SO.149 The
Club should be allowed to urge good moral behavior because it
emulates Jesus Christ. l50
On the establishment issue, Justice Scalia found no invalid
endorsement where religious expression is purely private and
"occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly
announced and open to all on equal terms.'''51 Regarding proselytizing he said: "A priest has as much right to proselytize as a
patriot.'''52
Justice Breyer joined the decision in part, but considered
the record was insufficient for a ruling on the Establishment
Clause. l53 Any evidence showing how a reasonable child would
understand the school's role, as endorsing or not endorsing a
religion, was lacking. l54
Justice Stevens dissented, pointing out that religious
speech is divided into three categories; 1) moral issues from a
religious perspective, 2) worship, and 3) proselytizing.155 He
contends that a limited forum can be declared by a school district giving access to public facilities. l56 The schools may prop-

145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 120.
at 123.
at 124.
Boy Scouts are asked to emulate past Boy Scout President Gerald Ford
at 12l.
at 129.

at 130.
at 129.
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erly exclude worship and proselytizing.'57 In this case, the
third, proselytizing was properly excluded. l158
Justice Souter gave a vigorous dissent referring to details
that were not set forth in the other opinions, in part as follows:
While Good News's program utilizes songs and games, the
heart of the meeting is the "challenge" and "invitation," which
are repeated at various times throughout the lesson. During
the challenge, "saved" children who "already believe in the
Lord Jesus as their Savior" are challenged to "stop and ask
God for the strength and the "want" ... to obey Him.' "They
are instructed that "[iJf you know Jesus as your Savior, you
need to place God first in your life. And if you don't know Jesus as Savior and if you would like to, then we will - we will
pray with you separately, individually .... And the challenge
would be, those of you who know Jesus as Savior, you can rely
on God's strength to obey Him. 159

On the basis of the foregoing, Souter concluded "it is beyond question that Good News intends to use the public school
premises not for the mere discussion of a subject from a particular Christian point of view, but for an evangelical service of
worship calling children to commit themselves in an act of
Christian conversion.",60 Souter did not believe that there was
an adequate record for the court to make a ruling on the Establishment Clause. 161 Since, however, the majority acted on the
matter, he observed "that the Establishment Clause cases have
consistently recognized the particular impressionability of
school children ... and the speech protection required for those
in elementary grades in the school forum.'''62 There isn't the
same opportunity that university students and adults have for
[d. at 132.
[d. at 133.
159 [d. at 137. Justice Ginsberg joined in the dissent. "During the invitation, the
teacher "invites" the "unsaved" children" to "trust the Lord Jesus to be your Savior
from sin," and "receiv[eJlhimJ as your Savior from sin." The children are then instructed that "[iJfyou believe what God's Word says about your sin and how Jesus died
and rose again for you, you can have His forever life today. Please bow your heads and
close your eyes. If you have never believed on the Lord Jesus as your Savior and would
like to do that, please show me by raising your hand. If you raised your hand to show
me you want to believe on the Lord Jesus, please meet me so I can show you from God's
Word how you can receive His everlasting life."
160 [d. at 138.
161 [d. at 144-45.
162 [d. at 142-23.
157
158
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intellectual exchange.'63 He further pointed out that the "timing and format" of the Good News gatherings may well suggest
that there is school endorsement of the Club's activities in the
minds of the young children. 164
COMMENT

The founding fathers labored hard to produce the Constitution, but they adjourned without providing for any bill of
rights. They felt that the basic individual rights of citizens
were so well understood and exercised by the people of their
states that it was not necessary to enumerate them by a series
of negative statements. The states, however, during the ratification process, did not agree. They insisted that the new federal government expressly recognize certain clear prohibitions
on its authority in order to guarantee the fundamental rights of
its citizens. It is indicative of the importance ofthe matter that
the very First Amendment begins with the protection of religious rights, first by prohibiting any law respecting the establishment of religion, then assuring the right of the free exercise
of religion. At the same time, the Amendment guarantees the
general right of freedom of speech and, as a result, there are
times when the Establishment Clause and the free speech
clause have been held in tension.
Regarding Justice Rehnquist's criticism that Justice
Breyer's comments are speculation, the prohibition set forth in
the Establishment Clause may well be characterized as "speculative. m65 There were no diverse religious problems at the time
of its adoption. When speculation is based on the experience of
history, it merits special attention and respect.
By the
mid-19th century, people in the United States were engaged in
religious controversy in the area of education. Indeed, the history of religious mistrust has been brought forward to the present in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and Bosnia. Contrary to Justice Rehnquist's criticism, Justice Breyer's dissent
is consistent with the speculative concerns of the Establishment Clause itself.

163
164

165

Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 at n7 (2002).
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The struggle between form and substance is clearly evident in the clash between majority and minority opinions in
both the Zelman and Good News cases. l66 The majority relies
on procedural neutrality, as supported in recent cases, to validate government aid to religious activity. The parents choose,
the individual chooses, the government funds or assists, but
there is no government endorsement of religion. The substantive effect of religious content, however, is disregarded. Teaching an entire curriculum in the context of a religious mission in
Zelman seems clearly to advance religion. The pervasive religious ritual and content in Good News is substantially more
than an expression of a point of view.
In Bowen v. Kendrick, the court held that government aid
could be given to a religious organization providing care services to pregnant adolescents irrespective of performing the
services in an environment of religious symbols or of the religious affiliation of teachers or caregivers. 167 A spate of federal
statutes followed, authorizing aid to sectarian along with secular organizations. The prevailing sectarian implementation in
the states is by church-sponsored, affiliated agencies such as
hospitals, health services, and psychiatric care. The statutes,
however, carry the restriction that the rendering of the service
must not violate the Establishment Clause. The intent appears
to be that sponsorship may be by a religious institution, but the
service must not be accompanied by religious pressure or proselytization.
The majority opinions in the Zelman and Good News cases
are not concerned with any threat to society and religious institutions posed by the prospects of entanglement. l68 The risks of
entanglement, when government interferes to protect the public purpose, are stated in Justice Douglas'S concurring opinion
in Lemon:
The surveillance or supervision of the States needed to police
grants involved in these cases, as aforementioned, puts a public investigator into each classroom and entails a pervasive
monitoring of these church agencies by the secular authori166 See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
167 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 622 (1988).
166 See supra note 166.
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ties. Yet, if every day surveillance or supervision does not occur, the zeal of religious proselytizers promises to carry the
day and make a shambles of the Establishment Clause.
Moreover, when people of many faiths are required to contribute money for the propaganda of one faith, the free exercise clause is infringed. 169

The most recent cases have required little, if any, monitoring. If the religious mission and government support become
excessively intertwined by reason of school policy and mission,
the program should be declared unconstitutional. The mission
itself excludes monitoring.
Under prevailing law, if proselyzing or a particular religious emphasis invests the administration of a charitable service, will the government monitor, or hearing officers intervene
and affect the religious practice itself? Does faith-based service
mean more religious content than faith-sponsored service?
Leaders of some religious institutions have expressed their concern over the pending faith-based legislation. The proposed
laws may authorize government departments to promulgate
rules for the funding of charitable agencies that would adversely affect religious practice or the religion itself. The sectarian concern is that expanded government funding of religious institutions providing social services will result in the
unhappy joining of politics and religion. Inevitably a divisive
competition for public funds and influence will result.
Still untouched by the view of neutrality are several Establishment limitations affecting the public schools such as the
prohibition of school prayers, the reading of Biblical verses before the start of classes, moments of silence or prayer in the
classroom, student-led prayer at football games, benedictions
by clergymen at graduation ceremonies,170 or the posting of the
Ten Commandments in the classroom or athletic arena. The
reason for the prohibitions is the divisive effect of such programs and the embarrassment of children who do not accept
the prayer. While school prayer is still targeted for legislation
by some religious groups, it appears to be a long way from passage or ultimate reconsideration by the Supreme Court.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1971).
Notwithstanding administrative efforts to require non-secular content or to
invite pastors of different faiths to perform the service.
169

170
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Also untouched are practices justified as complying with
the Establishment Clause by long historic custom such as invocations and benedictions at congressional and state legislative
sessions. The incoming President swearing on the Bible, "so
help me God," and "In God We Trust" on the coinage are all
phenomena that, in effect, have become secularized.
Embodied in American culture are high moral values derived from religious sources. Religious content, however, covers
much more than strictures for moral behavior. Religions differ
regarding content, including views on the relations of the individual to a Supreme Being or Authority; divine revelation and
judgment during life and after life; the origin of the world and
of man; ritual; prayer; and social practices. When government
funds provide total tuition for a student attending a religious
school whose religious mission is declared to permeate the curriculum, the government is supporting and advancing whatever aspects of religious content are being taught. This may be
contrary to the government's general educational position. The
Supreme Court, for example, held that a state law requiring
public schools to teach "Creation Science," if the theory of evolution is taught, violated the Establishment Clause as impermissibly endorsing and advancing religion. 171 The implication
in Zelman, however, is that public funding of such teaching, or
of Creation alone, would be supported in a voucher system
shielded by parental consent.
The First Amendment provides guarantees protective of
religion. Free exercise of speech and religion with varying theologies, rituals, and practices has flourished thereunder. The
United States is the most church-affiliated society in the western world. The First Amendment, however, begins with the
prohibition stated in the Establishment Clause. The Supreme
Court developed a three-pronged test to assure compliance with
this limitation. This test is becoming less and less difficult to
meet and the authority of the Establishment Clause is declining.

171 Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578, 579 (1987); Ashley M. Bell, "God Save
This Horwrable Court"; How Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be
Reconciled with the Secularization of Historical Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U. L.
REV. 1273 (2001) (arguing how current Establishment Clause jurisprudence can be
reconciled with the secularization of historical religious expressions).
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Many share Justice Souter's hope that the Court will reconsider. Reconsideration by a future court will bring the Establishment Clause out of "doctrinal bankruptcy" to its proper
level of effectiveness. This will result, in part, from paying appropriate attention to the nature and extent of religious content when evaluating the constitutionality of government
grants to religious institutions.
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